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A Cry for Clarity: Pennsylvania's Method




Pennsylvania law permits a cotenant of an oil and gas estate to
develop that entire oil and gas estate without the consent of other
cotenants. This right to develop without the consent of all of the
cotenants extends to a lessee-developer, and therefore an oil and gas
exploration and development company can lawfully develop an entire oil
and gas estate with a lease from just one cotenant.
Pennsylvania law also provides that the developer must compensate,
or "account to," the unleased cotenants for their share of the oil or gas
produced. Pennsylvania law, however, does not clearly provide how
developers should compensate unleased cotenants. No statutes or
regulations speak to the issue. Instead, developers are left to discern
century-old court opinions, which are extremely vague.
This Comment will provide an analysis of the current state of
Pennsylvania law by closely examining each court opinion that has ruled
on the proper method of compensating unleased cotenants. The purpose
of such an analysis is to guide developers who are plagued with the
current, ambiguous state of law regarding unleased cotenant
compensation. Next, this Comment will compare different methods of
compensation and, ultimately, urge Pennsylvania legislators to
unequivocally adopt the net-profits method with a risk penalty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pennsylvanians can proudly gloat about the drilling of the world's
first successful commercial oil well..I In 1859, Edwin Drake brought oil
to the surface of the Keystone State.2 When Drake did, he brought more
than just a fossil fuel to the small, rural town of Titusville, Pennsylvania;
he brought a reliable source of heat to our homes, fuel to the now
booming transportation industry, and countless products to the cosmetics,
1. See Ross H. Pifer, Drake Meets Marcellus: A Review of Pennsylvania Case Law
Upon the Sesquicentennial of the United States Oil and Gas Industry, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS
& ENERGY L. 47, 48 (2011) ("On August 27, 1859, Colonel Edwin L. Drake drilled the
first commercially successful oil well near Titusville, Pennsylvania.").
2. Id.
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apparel, and technology industries.3 In other words, Drake did more than
fuel his own pockets; he shaped the world as we know it.
The Pennsylvania oil wells also gave rise to countless laws, which
were designed to protect landowners, encourage development, and
facilitate drilling.4 In the twentieth century, however, Pennsylvania's oil
industry declined.5 As a result, "the development of Pennsylvania oil
and gas case law slowed considerably throughout the twentieth
century."6
Now, over a century later, Pennsylvania is experiencing a boom in
the natural gas industry7 due, in large part, to the pioneering of the
Marcellus Shale Formation.8 In 2005, Range Resources Appalachia,
LLC began to extract natural gas from the Marcellus Shale Formation.9
As of 2016-merely one decade later-developers have drilled nearly
eight-thousand active natural gas wells in Pennsylvania.'0
With the resurrection of the fossil fuel industry in Pennsylvania,
courts, oil and gas attorneys, landmen, and the like are finding
themselves dusting off century-old oil and gas law." Since then,
Pennsylvania courts have addressed some legal issues relating to oil and
gas development.12  Other legal issues, however, such as the proper
method of compensating an unleased cotenant of an oil and gas estate,
3. See AM. Ass'N OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS, http://www.aapg.org/about/petrol
eum-geology/petroleum-technology/petroleum-products (last visited Mar. 11, 2017)
(listing some of the less-commonly known products of petroleum, such as detergent,
vitamins, plastics, and DVDs).
4. See Pifer, supra note 1, at 48 ("Pennsylvania courts ... played an important role
in the early development of United States oil and gas law into the late nineteenth




8. Id. at 48-49. The Marcellus Shale is a geologic formation that contains natural
gas reserves. See id. at 48. This bountiful formation "traverses Pennsylvania in a
southwesterly to northeasterly direction and underlies all or a portion of approximately
fifty-five of the state's sixty-seven counties." Id.
9. Id. at 48.
10. Chris Amico et al., Shale Play: Natural Gas Drilling in Pennsylvania,
STATEIMPACT PENNSYLVANIA, http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/drilling (last visted
Mar. 11, 2017).
11. See, e.g., T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 282 (Pa. 2012)
(Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting that, "while initially being at the forefront of [the oil and
gas] field, [the Pennsylvania Supreme] Court's jurisprudence has remained largely
stagnant for the last 100 years"); see also Pifer, supra note 1, at 49 ("[T]he number of
legal issues that are being presented to state and federal courts in Pennsylvania is
significantly increasing.").
12. See Pifer, supra note 1, at 49 (discussing several issues of oil and gas law that
were addressed by Pennsylvania courts between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010).
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have not been addressed since the beginning of shale gas development.13
Consequently, developers cannot be certain whether they are paying
unleased cotenants the correct amount for their portion of the oil and gas
developed.14 Likewise, unleased cotenants, whose oil and gas is being
developed as a result of another cotenant's lease, cannot be certain
whether they are receiving the appropriate payment for their oil and
gas. 15
This uncertainty in Pennsylvania regarding the appropriate method
of accounting to unleased cotenants necessitates a careful examination of
the case law and demands a sound proposal to eradicate that uncertainty.
This Comment provides both. Part II will discuss how, in Pennsylvania,
one cotenant is permitted to develop oil or gas without the consent of
other cotenants.16 Part III examines the law-or lack thereof-regarding
payment to those nonconsenting, or unleased, Cotenants.17 Part III then
proposes that the legislature explicitly adopt one of the accounting
methods discussed.18
II. BACKGROUND
Development of oil and gas normally occurs through the execution
of an oil and gas lease between a developer and a landowner.19 These oil
and gas leases, which transfer the rights to explore for and produce oil
and gas, are typically executed because a landowner lacks the capital or
expertise to explore for and develop the oil and gas, while the producing
company generally has both the capital and expertise.20 In return for the
grant of development rights, the landowner-lessor ordinarily receives a
13. See Owen L. Anderson & Michael D. Cuda, The Nonconsenting Cotenant i  Oil
and Gas Development: The Oil Patch Version of the "Little Red Hen", ENERGY &
MINERAL LAW FOUND. 1, 4 (1991), http://www.emlf.org/clientuploads/
directory/whitepaper/AndersonCuda 91.pdf ("In Pennsylvania, the manner of
accounting for oil and gas development has not been clarified.").
14. See Michael K. Vennum & Kristin M. McCormish, Ownership ofAbandoned or
Dormant Minerals: A Comparison of Pennsylvania nd Ohio Law, 1 OIL, GAS, AND
MINING 2, 4-5 (2014), https://www.oilgasandmining.com/volumel/issue2/88-vln2-
vennum.
15. See id.
16. See infra Part II.
17 See infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See 2-18 EUGENE KUNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 18.1
(Matthew Bender ed., 2016) ("The oil and gas lease is the basic instrument under which
oil and gas exploration and development is ordinarily conducted.").
20. See JoHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 178
(West Publishing Co. eds., 6th ed. 2013).
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lease-signing bonus,21 rights to delay rentals,22 landowner's royalties,23
and shut-in royalties.24 The developer-lessee, on the other hand, obtains
a "working interest" in the oil and gas, in which it bears all of the costs
of exploration and production and retains for profit only the value of
production that is in excess of the development costs.25
Although lease execution between a developer and a sole owner of
an oil and gas estate is relatively straightforward, "[s]pecial problems
may arise when the [oil and gas] estate is owned by two or more
persons."26  Such joint-ownership in oil and gas interests is common
because owners "fail to designate mineral interests by will, so ... they
pass from generation to generation under intestacy laws."2 7 Therefore,
when a developer attempts to lease with cotenants. of an oil and gas
estate, "identifying and locating all co-owners may be difficult or
impossible because of the widespread fractionalization of mineral
interests."2 8 And even if all of the co-owners are located, they might not
agree upon development of the minerals.2 9 For example, one cotenant
might support development for the economic benefits, while another
cotenant of the same oil and gas estate might refuse development
because of environmental concerns.30
21. See JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 442 (West ed., 5th ed.
2009) [hereinafter NUTSHELL] (defining a bonus as a "payment to induce a lessor to
execute the lease").
22. See id. at 445 (defining a delay rental as a "payment from the lease holder to the
lessor to maintain the lease from period to period ... without drilling").
23. See id. at 452 (defining a landowner's royalty as the "share of production or
production revenues or value, free of costs of production, provided for the lessor in the
royalty clause of the oil and gas lease").
24. See id. at 463 (defining a shut-in royalty clause as a "lease provision permitting
the lessee to maintain the lease while there is no production from the premises because
wells capable of production are not producing").
25. See id. at 466 (defining a working interest as "[t]he rights to the mineral interest
granted by an oil and gas lease, so-called because the lessee acquires the right to work on
the leased property to search, develop and produce oil and gas (and the obligation to pay
costs)").
26. LOWE, supra note 20, at 429; see also KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.1 ("It is
possible for more than one person to own undivided interests in oil and gas rights in a
single tract of land.").
27. NUTSHELL, supra note 21, at 86. For a discussion of the concerns relating to
widespread fractionalization in the United States, see Managing Mineral Interests:
Solving the "Fractionalization" Puzzle, NAT'L Ass'N OF Div. ORDER ANALYSTS,
http://bit.ly/1LmP3kO (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
28. LOWE, supra note 20, at 429.
29. See id.
30. For a discussion of the positive and negative effects of oil and gas development,
which may give rise to controversy between cotenants, see Ross H. Pifer, What a Short,
Strange Trip it's Been: Moving Forward After Five Years of Marcellus Shale
Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REv. 615, 625 (2011).
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In situations where one or more cotenants of an oil and gas estate is
either missing or does not support development, a developer must
consider the following: (1) whether a cotenant has a right to develop
jointly-owned oil and gas without the consent of the other cotenant, and
(2) if so, whether the developing cotenant has a duty to compensate, or
"account to," the unleased cotenant.31
A. The Majority of States, including Pennsylvania, Allow Development
Without the Consent ofEvery Cotenant
When considering whether a cotenant has a right to develop jointly-
owned oil and gas without the consent of other cotenants, the law among
the states is not uniform.32  This lack of uniformity stems from the
varying interpretations of an English statute, the Statute of Westminster
II of 1285,33 which was uniformly adopted by every state.34 This statute,
and those modeled after it, gave rise to the common law of cotenancy in.
American jurisdictions and provided that "an action may lie by a Writ of
35Waste" in the case of a cotenant. . Relying on these statutes, cotenants
would attempt to enjoin other cotenants from developing the jointly-
owned minerals by claiming that development of the minerals without
the cotenant's consent was "waste." 6 Because waste was not defined in
the English statute or in any of the states' stitutes modeled after it,
however, courts came to different conclusions as to what was considered
37waste.
The minority of states, which includes West Viriginia, Michigan,39
Illinois, 40 and Louisiana,4' have held that it is waste for a cotenant to
31. See LOWE, supra note 20, at 429 ("In instances where known owners cannot
agree on development and other owners cannot be located, can one cotenant produce the
oil and gas over the objection of the other owners? ... If production does occur, what are
the producer's obligations to account?").
32. KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.2.
33. Statute of Westminster 111285, 13 Edw. 1 ch. 22.
34. See generally 2-5 PATRICK H. MARTIN AND BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 502 (Matthew Bender ed., 2016) [hereinafter WILLIAMS &
MEYERS] (recognizing the states' uniform adoption of the law of waste found in the
Statute of Westminster II).
35. See id. ("Since the Statute of Westminster II, ... a cotenant has been subject to
the law of waste.").
36. KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.2.
37. See id
38. See Law v. Heck Oil Co., 145 S.E. 601, 602 (W. Va. 1928); see also KUNTZ,
supra note 19, § 5.4 ("In West Virginia, acts which would constitute waste on the part of
a life tenant are also waste if done by a cotenant in the fee.").
39. See Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 16 N.W.2d 125, 125 (Mich. 1944). But see
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 319.101 (LexisNexis 2016) (providing that cotenants holding
a majority interest are authorized to develop and remove the oil or gas).
40. See, e.g., Murray v. Haverty, 70 111. 318, 318 (111. 1873).
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42develop oil and gas without the consent. of the other owners.
Accordingly, in these states, a cotenant does not have the right to develop
or to execute an oil and gas lease without the consent of the other
cotenants.4 3 Under the minority rule, if a cotenant proceeds without
consent from all of the cotenants, the developing cotenant could be held
liable for trespass, the oil and gas lease could be deemed void, and the
nonconsenting cotenant may have a right to enjoin the development.44
In the vast majority of states,45 however, the law of waste is not
applied to the extraction of jointly-owned oil and gas; therefore, one
cotenant-even one who owns the smallest of fractional interests-may
legally develop all of the oil and gas without the consent of the other
cotenants.4 6  Moreover, under the majority rule, a non-consenting
41. See Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 277 (La. 1919). But see LA. STAT.
ANN. § 31:166 (2016) (providing that a lessee of a mineral interest may develop with
"consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the
land...").
42. See KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.4; LOWE, supra note 20, at 431; NUTSHELL, supra
note 21, at 88.
43. See KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.4.
44. See id. It should be noted, however, that the minority rule is subject to an
exception that permits development, even without consent from cotenants, when the oil
or gas is being drained into a neighboring property's well. See, e.g., Law v. Heck Oil
Co., 145 S.E. 601, 602 (W. Va. 1928) (allowing development with either consent of the
cotenant or proof that development is "necessary to protect the oil and gas under such
land from drainage through wells on adjoining lands. . .").
45. See, e.g., White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 975 (Tex. 1948); Byrom v. Pendley,
717 S.W.2d 602, 602 (Tex. 1986); Earp v. Mid-Continent Petro. Corp., 27 P.2d 855, 861
(Okla. 1933); Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 38 P.2d 599, 601 (Mont.
1934); Stephens v. Click, 287 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Ky. 1955); Prewett v. Van Pelt, 235 P.
1059, 1060-61 (Kan. 1925); Slade v. Rudman Resources, Inc., 230 S.E.2d 284, 284 (Ga.
1976); P&N Inv. Corp. v. Florida Ranchettes, Inc., 220 S.2d 451, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969); Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237, 246-47 (Cal. 1935).
46. See KUNTz, supra note 19, § 5.3; LOWE, supra note 20, at 436. The policy
behind the majority rule, which is based on the fugacious nature of oil and gas, was aptly
explained by the Texas Supreme Court as follows:
The peculiar circumstances of a cotenancy in [oil] warrant one cotenant to
proceed and utilize the oil, without the necessity of the other cotenants
concurring. Oil is a fugitive substance and may be drained from the land by
well on adjoining property. It must be promptly taken from the land for it to be
secured to the owners.
Byrom, 717 S.W.2d at 605 (citing Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 335 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912)). Recognizing the urgency involved in the extraction of the oil or gas, a
Virginia judge, also supporting the majority view, stated that "[w]ithout such a rule, the
majority's interest in otherwise valuable mineral rights could be absolutely destroyed on
the whim of one recalcitrant co-owner." Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305, 310
(Va. 1988) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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fractional owner does not have the authority to prevent the other
cotenants from developing the minerals.47
Under the majority rule, the right to develop one's mineral interest
without the consent of other cotenants extends to a lessee.48 That is, a
fractional owner of a mineral interest may lease his right to develop the
minerals, and the other cotenants have no legal right to prevent the third-
party lessee from developing the property.49
Pennsylvania has long been "among the majority of states
permitting 'a cotenant in the fee . . . to explore for and produce oil and
gas without consent of his cotenants."'so As in the other majority states,
"[t]he analysis [in Pennsylvania] is not changed by the cotenant's choice
to lease his or her exploration and production rights to another.""1 In
Pennsylvania, therefore, one cotenant has the right to lease to a developer
the rights to the entire oil and gas estate.5 2
This long-standing Pennsylvania law allowing development without
the consent of all of the cotenants does not, however, stand for the
proposition that the unleased cotenants are owed nothing. Rather, the
producing cotenant must account to the other cotenants for their
proportionate share of the oil or gas.53 The manner in which these
47. See KuNTz, supra note 19, § 5.3; see WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 34, § 502
("The non-consenting cotenant is legally disabled from enjoining the drilling cotenant's
operations in exploring for, and producing, hydrocarbons.").
48. See Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1924) (stating that a
cotenant's "lessee upon entry will become for the time being a tenant in common with the
other owners and entitled to the same rights in relation to the other cotenants that his
lessor had").
49. See KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.3 ("To the extent that a mineral owner is
privileged to extract minerals, he may execute an oil and gas lease and confer such right
upon his lessee.").
50. Markowicz v. Swepi LP, 940 F. Supp. 2d 222, 228 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citing
KUNTz, supra note 19, § 5.3); see also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 34, § 502
(including Pennsylvania among "a majority of the producing states [in which] a
concurrent owner ... has been given the power to lease and develop his interest in the
land concurrently owned" and explaining that the "non-consenting cotenant is legally
disabled from enjoining the drilling cotenant's operations"); Lichtenfels v. Bridgeview
Coal Co., 496 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("Another special rule relating to the
mineral estate is that a tenant cannot restrain a cotenant with an undivided interest in the
land from realizing the value of the estate by producing or consuming the underlying
minerals.").
51. Markowicz, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 228 (citing McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949, 954
(Pa. 1912), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that "[t]he fact that the
actual operations were carried on by third parties under a lease, and not directly by [the
cotenant], would not serve to make the [lessees] trespassers, or to cause them to be
regarded other than as cotenants.").
52. See id.
53. See KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.6 ("In those jurisdictions which recognize that a
cotenant has the right to enter and extract oil and gas without the consent or over the
[Vol. 121:3934
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unleased cotenants are accounted to, however, is unclear in
Pennsylvania. Given the lack of clarity, before examining
Pennsylvania's case law, a closer look at other jurisdictions' more
definite and concrete methods of accounting to unleased cotenants is
warranted.
B. The Prevailing Methods ofAccounting to Unleased Cotenants: The
Net-Profits Method and the Royalty Method
Outside of Pennsylvania, courts have developed two methods to
account to unleased cotenants.54  The majority of courts use the net-
profits method of accounting,55 while the minority of courts use the
royalty method of accounting.6
Under. the net-profits method, the developer must account to the
unleased cotenants for their portion of the net profits from the oil and gas
produced.57  To illustrate, assume Co-Owner A and Co-Owner B are
cotenants of Blackacre, each owning fifty percent. Assume also that a
developer signs a lease with Co-Owner A, while Co-Owner B is
unwilling to sign a lease. This developer, under the terms of the lease,
has the right to develop all of Blackacre's gas.8 If this developer
produces one hundred dollars of gas from Blackacre and undergoes fifty
dollars of expenses to produce that gas, the gas well nets fifty dollars of
profit. Because Co-Owner B owns fifty percent of Blackacre, however,
Co-Owner B is entitled to fifty percent of that profit, or twenty-five
dollars. Under the net-profits method, therefore, the developer would
retain only twenty-five dollars, the remaining profit, less the royalty
payments to Co-Owner A per the terms of the lease.
Significantly, under the net-profits method, if the venture results in
a loss instead of a profit, the developer is not entitled to recover from the
protest of his cotenants, although the entry and extraction of such substances is not
wrongful, the operating cotenant is required to account to his cotenants.").
54. See F. G. Madara, Annotation, Basis of Computation of Cotenant's
Accountability for Minerals and Timber Removed from the Property, 5 A.L.R.2D 1368, 2
(1949).
55. See LOWE, supra note 20, at 436. Accord Howard R. Williams, The Effect of
Concurrent Interests on Oil and Gas Transactions, 34 TEX. L. REv. 519, 523 (1956)
("The clear weight of authority in this country in the states which permit one concurrent
owner to develop minerals without the consent or joinder of his co-owners is that the
non-joining concurrent owner is entitled to a proportionate share of the proceeds of
development less a proportionate share of the reasonable and necessary costs of
development and production.").
56. See LOWE, supra note 20, at 438 (providing that a royalty basis is supported by
only "limited [judicial] authority"); Williams, supra note 55, at 523.
57. See Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 573 (8th Cir. 1924).
58. See infra Part II.B.
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unleased cotenant.59 Instead, "[i]f the operations are unsuccessful ... the
entire burden falls upon the [the developer] . . . . In the above
example, if the gas well cost fifty dollars but produced only twenty-five
dollars, the developer would lose twenty-five dollars; Co-Owner B, the
unleased party, would lose nothing. Under the net-profits method,
therefore, the developer assumes all of the risk in exploration and
development.
As an alternative to the net-profits method of accounting, a few
courts have adopted the royalty method of accounting to unleased
cotenants. Under this method, the unleased cotenants, similar to the
leased cotenants, are paid a royalty based upon the production, not the
profitability, of the oil or gas well.62 That is, the. unleased cotenant is
accounted to immediately upon the commencement of production, even
before the well becomes profitable.6 3 Therefore, even .if the well is
producing at a loss, an unleased cotenant will receive payments based on
a fraction of the value of the oil or gas brought to the surface and sold.6
On the other hand, if the well becomes hugely profitable, the unleased
cotenant continues to receive only a small fraction of production based
on the royalty.65
An obvious problem with the royalty method is determining the
appropriate royalty amount.66 The unleased cotenant's royalty could be
.calculated a number of ways. For example, the royalty could mirror the
royalty in the lessor-cotenant's lease, essentially forcing the unleased
cotenant into that same lease. Alternatively, the unleased cotenant's
royalty could be set by a statutory minimum.67 Courts that have adopted
the royalty method have not provided much guidance as to the
appropriate royalty amount.68 This lack of definitiveness in the royalty
method is likely the consequence of its rare application.69 For example,
in Kentucky, the royalty method's application is limited only to
59. See LOWE, supra note 20, at 436.
60. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 34, § 504.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Royalty payments in oil and gas are typically "provided by the oil and gas lease
royalty clause[,]" which reserves for the lessor a "royalty, measured as a percentage of




66. See infra Part III.B.1.
67. See infra Part III.B.1.
68. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Blanton, 282 S.W. 1061, 1064-65 (Ky. 1926).
69. See id.
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circumstances where the developer believed, in good faith, that the entire
interest was subject to the lease.70
As discussed, courts have adopted two methods of accounting to
unleased cotenants-the net-profits method and the royalty method. The
vast majority of courts have adopted the net-profits method, and those
courts that have applied the royalty method have, for the most part,
limited its application.
III. ANALYSIS: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: THE CURRENT,
CONVOLUTED STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA CASE LAW REGARDING
ACCOUNTING TO UNLEASED COTENANTS
In Pennsylvania, the duty to account to unleased cotenants has been
recognized,7 1 but the proper method of accounting to those cotenants is
not clear. Pennsylvania has no statutes or regulations dictating the
compensation of unleased cotenants, and the only relevant court
opinions, most of which are over a century old, are ambiguous.72 In
analyzing these Pennsylvania court opinions, some commentators have
stated that the weight of authority leans toward a net-profits method.73
Other commentators, however, have stated that Pennsylvania courts have
adopted the royalty method.74
In light of the uncertainty, this Part of the Comment will provide an
analysis of the Pennsylvania cases that address the compensation of
cotenants. First, Subpart A will. address the cases, that adopt the royalty
method.7s Next, Subpart B will address the cases that commentators
have relied upon in asserting that courts have adopted the net-profits
method.76 Ultimately, this Comment finds that the relevant Pennsylvania
70. See id.
71. See Vennum & McCormish, supra note 14, at 5 ("The duty to account is not
statutorily created in Pennsylvania, but it was initially established as an equitable means
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in App. Of Fulmer, 18 A. 493 (Pa. 1889).").
72. See infra Part III.A-C.
73. See Vennum & McCormish, supra note 14, at 5 ("Although there are some
Pennsylvania cases to the contrary, the overall weight of authority favors the argument
that a prudent operator should suspend the net profits attributable to the unleased co-
tenant's proportional interest.").
74. See LowE, supra note 20, at 438 (citing two cases, Germer v. Donaldson, 18
F.2d 697, 697 (3d Cir. 1927) and McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949, 949 (Pa. 1912) as
"authority for granting the carried cotenant a royalty on his share of production rather
than a net profits interest"); WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 34, § 504 (citing McIntosh
as "authority that a cotenant (or his lessee) may develop minerals in a tract without the
consent of his concurrent owners and account to them by payment of the usual royalty");
KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.6 (citing McIntosh) (stating that, "[iun Pennsylvania, the view
has been taken that the value of the oil and gas in place is best measured by the value of
the privilege of removing it represented by the royalty").
75. See infra Part III.A.
76. See infra Part III.B.
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court opinions are strongly in favor of the royalty method and that the
cases relied upon for the net-profits method barely, if at all, support an
adoption of the net-profits method.7 7 In light of these findings, this Part
of the Comment concludes by explaining how oil and gas developers
should proceed.
A. Pennsylvania Cases That Support he Royalty Method ofAccounting
1. McIntosh v. Ropp: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case that
Ruled in Favor of the Royalty Method of Accounting
Commentators that believe Pennsylvania courts have adopted the
royalty method rely primarily on the century-old Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case of McIntosh v. Ropp.79 In McIntosh, a life tenant executed an
oil and gas lease for his property, a 128 acre farm in Butler County,
Pennsylvania, at a one-eighth royalty.80 At the time of the life tenant's
death, the two remainder-men to the property were Edward McIntosh
and Addie McIntosh." Edward had ratified the lease, but Addie had
not.82 After the life tenant's death, the developer paid the royalty to both
Edward and Addie in equal proportions, with each of these cotenants
receiving one-half of the royalty. 83
Addie McIntosh then instituted an action against the developer,
praying for an accounting for her share of the oil, gas, and other by-
products, less the royalty that she had already received.84 She contended
that the measure of her damages was "the market value of the oil after it
had been severed from the land less the expense of production and the
royalty paid by the defendant."85 Essentially, Addie Mcintosh was
claiming that she was entitled to an accounting under the net-profits
basis. In response, the defendant developer argued for using the royalty
method, contending that "the only proper measure was the value of the
oil in place as represented by the royalty already paid." 86
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that "the plaintiff could
only recover her one-half interest in the land subject to the right of the
77. See infra Part IILA-B.
78. See infra Part III.C.
79. McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912); see LOWE, supra note 20, at 438;
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 34, § 504; KUNTZ, supra note 19, § 5.6. (citing
McIntosh, 82 A. at 949).
80. See McIntosh, 82 A. at 952.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 953-54.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 953.
86. Id.
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defendant to continue to operate under the lease on paying her a
[proportion of the] one-eighth royalty."87 Although the court seemingly
adopted the royalty method by ruling in favor of the defendant, the court
was far from explicit when it reasoned as follows:
In every case of this character the measure of damage must depend
largely upon the peculiar circumstances, but compensation is the
usual rule where there are no facts showing intentional wrong; and as
between tenants in common such compensation may be measured by
the fair market value of the mineral in place, which may be figured
on the basis of the royalty to be obtained for the 8rivilege of
removing such mineral, in view of all the circumstances.
The court, therefore, did rule in favor of the royalty method under
the specific facts of the case, but it stated two separate times that the
method of accounting depends upon the "circumstances" of the case.9
Thus, a fair interpretation of the rule stated in McIntosh can be
summarized as follows: (1) unleased cotenants are compensated for the
"fair market value" of the oil or gas "in place," and (2) depending on the
circumstances, the fair market value of oil or gas in place "may" be
equivalent to a royalty payment.90
2. Germer v. Donaldson: Seemingly Cementing the Royalty
Method into Pennsylvania Case Law
Fifteen years after McIntosh, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit adopted the royalty method.91 In Germer v. Donaldson,92 two oil
and gas co-owners, Donaldson and Germer, executed a lease that gave
them the right to participate in oil or gas wells drilled if they paid the
lessee-developer for half of the drilling expenses.93 Germer exercised his
right, paid his share of drilling costs, and thereafter received his share of
net profits.94 Donaldson, however, supposedly forgetting his interest, did
87. Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See id.
90. McIntosh, 82 A. at 954. The most recent case-on-point citing to McIntosh is the
federal case Markowicz v. Swepi LP, 940 F. Supp. 2d 222, 228 (M.D. Pa. 2013). In
Markowicz, the court reiterated the first premise from McIntosh, stating that the unleased
cotenant is "simply compensate[d] (according to his interest) ... for the fair value of the
minerals extracted by the lessee." Id. (emphasis added) (citing McIntosh, 82 A. at 954).
Because the issue of compensation was ultimately unnecessary for the holding in
Markowicz, however, the opinion failed to clarify whether the "fair value" of the oil or
gas in place is equivalent to royalties or net profits.
91. See Germer v. Donaldson, 18 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1927).
92. Germer v. Donaldson, 18 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1927).
93. See id at 698.
94. See id
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not exercise his right to participate.95 Instead, Donaldson contacted the
lessee after the costs of drilling had been paid and demanded an
accounting on the basis of net profits, the same that Germer had
received.96
Citing McIntosh, the Third Circuit held that Donaldson was "not
entitled to profits, but only to the customary royalty[,]" which Donaldson
admitted was normally one-eighth of oil production.97 The Third Circuit
reasoned as follows:
In mining and oil operations[,] large expenses and great risks are
necessarily incurred. No one can tell in advance what the result or
expense will be. Oil or mineral in the ground has only a speculative
value. It is therefore inequitable for one joint owner of oil or mineral
in place ... to refuse to participate in an enterprise, but wait until the
other has assumed the expense and risk of success, and then demand
his proportional share of the profits.98
The Third Circuit went on to state that the rule is not changed by
"[t]he fact that a co-owner of oil in place does not know of the operation,
or that he knows of it, but refuses to give his consent to the withdrawal of
the oil. . . ."9 That is, under Germer, the knowledge of the non-
consenting cotenant is irrelevant.100 Whether such cotenant is missing or
locatable and withholding consent, the royalty method is an appropriate
measure of the value of the oil or gas in place.10' In short, Germer
appears to be clear authority for the royalty method under almost any
circumstances.
3. Baily Petition: Applying the Royalty Method in Absence of
Malice
Another case adding to the analysis, In re Baily Petition,10 2 held that
the royalty method is appropriate where the developing cotenant acted
without malice.10 3 In Baily Petition, John Stewart's father devised to him
a 122 acre farm, 72 acres absolutely, and the remaining 50 acres of land
for life. 104 According to the will, if John were to die without living issue,
the 50-acre tract was to revert to his three sisters in equal proportion in
95. See id
96. See id.





102. In re Baily Petition, 76 A.2d 645 (Pa. 1950).
103. See id. at 647
104. See id. at 646-47.
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fee simple.'05 Prior to John's death, however, each of John's sisters
conveyed to him their respective one-third interests in the 50 acres.10 6
Then, upon John's death, he had no issue.107 As a result, the court found
that only one of the sisters' one-third interests had vested,08 leaving two-
thirds of the tract with the heirs of the remaining two sisters, Maria and
Emma.0 9
Prior to John's death, he had executed an oil and gas lease covering
the entire 122 acres to Peoples Natural Gas Company for a yearly royalty
of $400.110 Because a life tenant typically may not extract minerals or
lease mineral rights where a well was not drilled before the life estate
accrued, the heirs of Maria and Emma argued that the lease was void.'"
But the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that John was in fact a
cotenant who believed, in good faith, that he had the right to the entire
tract,..and therefore the lease was valid as to Maria and Emma's
interests. 12
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania went on to hold that, "[i]n
absence of malice[,] . . . the damages to the 2/3 interest of the other
tenants in common could be fairly measured by the value of the royalties
paid which were the usual customary royalties."113 In affirming the
lower court's application of the royalty method, the Supreme Court noted
that the lower court had cited to McIntosh.114 However, the Supreme
Court did not further elaborate on McIntosh and failed to discuss the
"peculiar circumstances""' in which the royalty method applies.16 But
because the court explicitly recognized the absence of malice, a strong
inference can be drawn that, if the developing cotenant acts without





108. To come to this conclusion, the court analyzes the facts under the "doctrine of




112. Baily Petition, 76 A.2d at 646-47.
113. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
114. See id.
115. See McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949, 954 (Pa. 1912) ("In every case [involving
accounting to unleased cotenants,] the measure of damage must depend largely upon the
peculiar circumstances .... .").
116. See Baily Petition, 76 A.2d at 647.
117. See id.
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B. Pennsylvania Cases That Ostensibly Support he Net-Profits
Method ofAccounting
Although McIntosh and subsequent cases interpreting McIntosh
appear to have solidified the royalty method as the appropriate method of
accounting, some commentators have pointed to other Pennsylvania
cases as support for the net-profits method."1 s After a closer
examination, however, these cases either applied the net-profits method
in very limited circumstances or offered no support for the method at all.
1. McGowan v. Bailey: A Pre-McIntosh Case Using Net Profits
Where Royalties Were Indeterminable
First, the 1897 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case McGowan v.
Bailey19 ultimately ruled in favor of the net-profits method, but it
appears to have done so solely because this method of accounting was
the only one in which a value of the minerals could be ascertained from
the evidence presented. 120
In McGowan, the court stated that the "value of the ore in place" is
the only just basis of accounting to the non-developing cotenant. 121 I
other words, the court found that the non-developing cotenant was
entitled to the value of the minerals before they were extracted if the
development had not occurred.122 Notably, this logic was used later in
McIntosh.12 3 The rule appears to be clear, therefore, that accounting to
cotenants must be based on the value of "the minerals in place."l24
As the McGowan court demonstrated, however, the value of the
minerals in place prior to extraction can be difficult to determine.125 In
McGowan, the court had no evidence of what the ore was worth when it
118. See Vennum & McCormish, supra note 14, at 5 ("Although there are some
Pennsylvania cases to the contrary, the overall weight of authority favors the argument
that a prudent operator should suspend the net profits attributable to the unleased co-
tenant's proportional interest."); Lisa McManus, Accounting to the Unleased Cotenant,
SLIDESHARE (Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.slideshare.net/LisaMcManusJD/accounting-to-
the-unleased-cotenant (citing several cases as supporting a net profits method); Anderson
& Cuda, supra note 13, at § 16.03 n.43 (citing several cases as supporting the net profits
method).
119. See McGowan v. Bailey, 36 A. 325 (Pa. 1897).
120. See id. at 326.
121. Id. (citing Coleman's Appeal, 62 Pa. 252 (Pa. 1869)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
122. See id
123. See McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949, 954-55 (Pa. 1912) (citing McGowan for the
proposition that the non-developing cotenant should be compensated based on "the fair
market value of the mineral in place").
124. See id.
125. See McGowan, 36 A. at 326.
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was in the ground.12 6 Instead, the only evidence presented pertained to
"the value of the ore at the mine's mouth."12 7 But such a value, by itself,
was not representative of the non-developer's ore in place because the
ore is worth more after extraction.128 Accordingly, the court worked
backwards from the value of the ore at the mine's mouth to the value of
the ore in place by "deducting the expenses of [getting it to the
mouth]."12 9  By subtracting extraction costs from the post-extraction
value, the court effectively applied the net-profits method.
Although McGowan is commonly cited to as authority for the net-
profits approach,13 0 the case appears to be just one example of a situation
where circumstances warranted an accounting under the net-profits
method. That is, where the aggrieved cotenant's share of the minerals in
place cannot be valued in a manner other than the proportionate net
profits, the aggrieved cotenant is entitled to such net profits. 13 1
In fact, when later cited by McIntosh, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court cited McGowan for the proposition that the appropriate
compensation is the "fair market value of the mineral in place, which
may be figured on the basis of the royalty to be obtained for the privilege
of removing such mineral."1 32  Thus, McGowan does not contradict
McIntosh's holding in favor the royalty approach; it merely provides a
different means of compensating the unleased cotenant when the royalty
method is not feasible.
2. Bell v. Johnston: Very Weak Support for the Net-Profits
Method
Next, commentators have cited to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
case Bell v. Johnsonl33 as support for the net profits basis,13 4 but
questionably so. The Bell opinion does not analyze whether a cotenant is
entitled to compensation for oil and gas developed.135 Instead, the Bell




129. Id. ("[T]hat value was 40 cents per hundred bushels.")
130. See, e.g., Anderson & Cuda, supra note 13, § 16.03 n.43 (citing McGowan as
authority for the net-profits approach in Pennsylvania).
131. See McGowan, 36 A. at 326.
132. McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949, 954 (Pa. 1912) (emphasis added) (citing
McGowan).
133. Bell v. Johnston, 126 A. 187 (Pa. 1924).
134. See McManus, supra note 118 (citing Bell as supporting a net-profits method);
Anderson & Cuda, supra note 13, § 16.03 n.43 (same).
135. See Bell, 126 A. at 187-89.
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cotenants of an oil lease.136 In Bell, these cotenants divided profits and
losses from development of oil, and one party introduced the evidence of
shared profits and losses as evidence that a partnership existed.13 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the "mere fact that the
parties were tenants in common in the oil leases, dividing the profits and
losses, is not sufficient to justify a finding that Bell and Johnston were
[partners].""3 The court then went on to state, citing McIntosh, that "no
presumption of [a partnership arises] from the joint ownership of the
land[,] ... though the tenant in common in an oil and gas lease has the
right to recover his share of the profits by suit." 39 In other words, the
Bell court was stating that, although a cotenant has a right to recover oil
and gas profits from another cotenant, such a right is irrelevant to the
issue of whether the cotenants 'have legally formed a partnership.140
Because this point regarding the right to recover was irrelevant to the
court's holding that no partnership existed, this language is dicta.
Accordingly, the fact that the court used the word "profits" in dicta does
not have a bearing upon the current state of law.
3. Kelley v. Kelley: Providing Little, if Any, Support for the Net-
Profits Method
Yet another case with questionable relevance, but which
commentators use as support for the net-profits method,141 is the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Kelley v. Kelley.14 2 In Kelley, the
complainant sought an. accounting for her proportionate share of the
profits derived from a coal mining' operation on lands commonly
owned.143
Although the Kelley court ruled in favor of the complainant, it did
so on grounds unrelated to the proper method of accounting. In Kelley,
the appellant posed only two questions, "one as to the jurisdiction of the
court to grant the relief sought and the other as its jurisdiction of the
defendants."'4 In response to the first question raised, the court cited to
the following statement from McIntosh: "the Act of April 25, 1850,. . .
recognizes . . . a right [by a tenant in common against a cotenant] ... to
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 188.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. See McManus, supra note 118 (citing Kelley as supporting a net-profits
calculation); Anderson & Cuda, supra note 13, at § 16.03 n.43 (same).
142. Kelley v. Kelley, 115 A.2d 202 (Pa. 1955).
143. Id. at 206.
144. Id. at 203.
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recover a share of the profits of the estate where minerals are held in
common... ."145 The Kelley court, however, was not using this
statement with regard to the method of accounting, but instead, the court
was merely using the statement to find that it did, in fact, have
jurisdiction to compel an accounting.146 Thus, the notion that Kelley is
authority for a net profits basis in Pennsylvania is suspect.
C. How Oil and Gas Developers Should Proceed Given the Current
State ofLaw
Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that an unleased
cotenant will receive the value of the oil or gas "in place."1 4 7 In other
words, Pennsylvania courts find that an unleased cotenant is entitled to
the monetary worth of the oil or gas before it was extracted.148  As
demonstrated by the courts, however, valuing the oil or gas before
extraction is not a simple task. 149
Nonetheless, the overall weight of Pennsylvania authority suggests
that, where a reasonable royalty is ascertainable, that royalty represents
the value of the cotenant's oil or gas "in place."150  That is, where a
developer can produce evidence of a fair royalty value, which it likely
can, st a Pennsylvania court will likely apply the royalty method.
Consequently, a developer should compensate unleased cotenants on the
basis of a reasonable royalty as production occurs.152
Due to the uncertainty in the law, however, a.wise developer would
also be prepared to pay unleased cotenants for their share of profits from
the jointly-owned land. Thus, developers hould set aside the unleased
cotenants' proportionate share of profits, less any amount of royalties
alreadypaid to such unleased cotenants. Doing so will guarantee that the
145. Id. at 205 (citing McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949, 954 (Pa. 1912)).,
146. See id.
147. See McIntosh, 82 A. at 949; McGowan v. Bailey, 36 A. 325, 326 (Pa. 1897).
148. See McIntosh, 82 A. at 949; McGowan, 36 A. at 326.
149. See, e.g., McGowan, 36 A. at 326 (requiring an accounting on the basis of net
profits because this was the only ascertainable valuation of the minerals); see also
McIntosh, 82 A. at 955 (distinguishing a West Virginia case that held in favor of the net-
profits method because, in that case, "[t]here was no evidence as to the proper royalty to
be paid").
150. Vennum & McCormish, supra note 14, at 5.
151. In Pennsylvania, the Guaranty Minimum Royalty Act (GMRA), 58 Pa. Stat.
Ann. § 33, provides that a lease shall not be valid if the lease does not guarantee the
lessor at least a one-eighth royalty. Royalty payments to unleased cotenants of at least
one-eighth, therefore, will likely be considered reasonable.
152. See McManus, supra note 118 (finding that the "[e]stablished law would indicate
that a royalty accounting is appropriate, except where no evidence of fair royalty exists,
in which case a net-profits accounting is appropriate").
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developer has sufficient funds to pay the unleased cotenant if that
cotenant files suit and the court applies the net-profits basis.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE
SHOULD ADOPT THE NET-PROFITS METHOD WITH A RISK PENALTY
Under the current, convoluted state of Pennsylvania law, a
developer cannot guarantee the legality of its method of compensating
unleased cotenants. Accordingly, the legislature of Pennsylvania should
adopt an explicit method of accounting to unleased cotenants.
The legislature should not adopt what appears to be the judicially-
supported method of accounting to unleased cotenants in Pennsylvania-
the royalty method. A major problem with the royalty method is that the
royalty could be based on a number of metrics, such as the royalty in the
cooperating cotenant's leasel53 or the customary royalty in the area.15 4 If
based on the cooperating, leased cotenant's royalty, the statute would
essentially be forcing the other cotenants into the cooperating cotenant's
lease. If based upon the customary royalty, the amount would be
extremely uncertain. Thus, the royalty method should not be adopted.
Instead, the legislature should adopt the net-profits method, and it
should impose a risk penalty on the amount of profits paid to the
unleased cotenant. As Pennsylvania courts have recognized, developers
face extraordinary risk when they invest great sums of money into
drilling ventures that might not provide returns..ss Under a net-profits
method, a cotenant could refuse to sign a lease, let the developer assume
all of the development risks, and wait to see if the venture is profitable.1
5 6
If the well is profitable, the unleased cotenant has the opportunity to join
in on the profits, after the fact.157  If the well is not profitable, the
unleased cotenant has lost nothing aside from foregone royalty
payments. 158
153. See In re Baily Petition, 76 A.2d 645, 646-47 (Pa. 1950) (apportioning to the
unleased cotenants their share of the royalties that the cooperating, leased cotenant had
agreed to in the lease).
154. See Germer v. Donaldson, 18 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1927) (holding that the
cotenant was "entitled .. . to the customary royalty[,]" which was one-eighth of
production).
155. See, e.g., id. at 699 ("In mining and oil operations[,] large expenses and great
risks are necessarily incurred. No one can tell in advance what the result or expense will
be. Oil or mineral in the ground has only a speculative value. It is therefore inequitable
for one joint owner of oil or mineral in place . . . to refuse to participate in an enterprise,
but wait until the other has assumed the expense and risk of success, and then demand his
proportional share of the profits.").
156. See supra Part II.B.
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. See supra Part II.B.
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Consequently, under a net profits approach, fractional landowners
have an incentive to resist leasing.159 Without the entire leasehold
interest, however, a developer will likely avoid the co-owned tract
altogether.160 The developer would avoid the tract because a probable
return on investment would not be worth the risk of developing the co-
owned tract, as the developer would bear all of the risk of loss, but gain
only a proportionate share of the profitability of the well. 161  The
cooperating cotenants of these fractionalized tracts, therefore, suffer the
consequences of the cotenant refusing to lease because the developer will
not lease the tract of land at all.
The solution to the incentive problem inherent in the net-profits
method is the implementation of a risk penalty.162 As its name suggests,
the risk penalty would impose a penalty on the unleased cotenants for
their refusal to undergo the risk of development. With a risk penalty in
place, before the developer must compensate the unleased cotenants for
their share of profits, the developer would be entitled to deduct a set
penalty amount, in addition to the amount for reasonable costs of
drilling.1 6 4 It follows that, if a cotenant is missing or refuses to lease, the
developer - is not deterred from developing because it will be
compensated for the risk that it assumed.
If the net-profits method is adopted in Pennsylvania, a risk penalty
should be imposed on unleased cotenants. Although no state has
implemented such a method, the risk penalty has proved to be workable
in other areas of oil and gas law, such as forced pooling.16 ' Adopting the
net-profits method with a risk penalty, therefore, would create a method
of accounting to unleased cotenants that is fair for all of the parties
involved in development.
159. See supra Part II.B.
160. See NUTSHELL, supra note 21, at 91-92 (explaining that development without the
consent of every cotenant makes "little economic sense" because the developer will "bear
100% of the risk loss" but gain only a proportionate share of the well's profitability).
161. See id
162. The term "risk penalty" originates from forced pooling, a separate but
comparable area of oil and gas law. See Brigid R. Landy & Michael B. Reese, Getting to
"Yes": A Proposal for a Statutory Approach to Compulsory Pooling in Pennsylvania, 41
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11044, 11053 (2011).
163. See id. ("The risk-penalty approach seeks to eliminate a holdout's free ride and
to compensate the operator for drilling costs.").
164. For example, similar to the risk penalty imposed under New Mexico's forced
pooling statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-2-17 (1977), here, a risk penalty could allow the
developer to recover up to two hundred percent of the unleased cotenant's proportionate
share of the costs of development.
165. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Pennsylvania, after acquiring a leasehold interest from one
cotenant of an oil and gas estate, a developer can legally produce oil and
gas from the entire oil and gas estate. Pennsylvania law, however, does
not specify how to compensate the unleased cotenants. Overall, the
century-old Pennsylvania court opinions that speak to this issue suggest
that a developer must compensate unleased cotenants on the basis of a
reasonable royalty. But with some cases suggesting otherwise,
developers cannot be certain or appropriately budget for development of
co-owned oil and gas.
This uncertainty necessitates immediate action. The Pennsylvania
legislature should pass a law that explicitly adopts one method of
compensating unleased cotenants. The net-profits method is more just
from a landowner's perspective, but it can also discourage development.
Therefore, the legislature should adopt the net-profits method and impose
a risk penalty on unleased cotenants,. which will allow the developers to
recover more from their investments and, in turn, will encourage
development.
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